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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FRANK GRANATO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-v-

Case No. 14425

THE SALT LAKE COUNTY
GRAND JURY, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE,
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT,
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL,
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS (Relating to Indictment), and
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS (Relating to Habeas Corpus)
are as previously stated and explained in the appellant's original brief.
ARGUMENT
Point I
A PERSON RELEASED ON BAIL HAS APPROPRIATE
RELIEF BY HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS TO
CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
RESTRAINT OF HIS LIBERTY.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The respondents totally rely on ancient case law to support the
position that a person released from custody on bail is not so restrained
of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. Stallings v.
Splain, 253 U.S. 339, 77 A.L.R,2d 1308 (1920). However, in Hensley v.
Municipal Court, San Jose Milpitas J.D., Cal., 411 U.S. 345 (1973), the
United States Supreme Court completely rejected the respondents' position
and ruled that a person released on bail is in sufficient constructive custody to permit the application for a writ of habeas corpus. Expressly
overruling Stallings, supra (see Hensley, footnote 8), the Court reasoned
that although a person released on bail is not in actual physical confinement, the restraint on his freedom of movement is a sufficient restraint
of his liberty to warrant the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
He [the accused] cannot come and go
as he pleases. His freedom of movement rests in the hands of state
judicial officers, who may demand
his presence at any time and without
a moment's notice. Disobedience is
itself a criminal offense. The
restraint on his liberty is surely no
less severe than the conditions
imposed on the unattached reserve
officer whom we held to be in custody in S t r a ^ ^
supra.
411 U.S. at 351.
The Supreme Court's position in Hensley, supra, is not one
unrecognized by other courts, but, in fact, reflects the position taken in
the majority of state and federal jurisdictions when a person released on
bail seeks habeas corpus as a remedy for illegal restraint. 411 U.So at
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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349 c According to the majority position, the writ of habeas corpus must
be administered with initiative and flexibility.
The very nature of the writ demands
that it be administered with initiative
and flexibility essential to insure that
miscarriages of justice within its
reach are surfaced and corrected.
(Citations omitted.)
Thus, we have consistently rejected
interpretations of the habeas corpus
statute that would suffocate the writ
in stifling formalisms or hobble its
effectiveness with the nanacles of
arcane and scholastic procedural
requirements. The demand for speed,
flexibility and simplicity is clearly
evident in our decisions concerning
the exhaustion doctrine. (Citations
omitted, emphasis added.) 411 U. So
at 350.
As the Supreme Court has "consistently rejected interpretations of the habeas corpus statute that would suffocate the writ or hobble
its effectiveness, " it is incumbent that the Utah Supreme Court make a
similar ruling. Rule 65B(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that habeas corpus is the proper remedy when it appears that TTany person
is unjustly imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his liberty." (Emphasis
added.) A reading of In re Petersen, 51 Cal. 2d 177, 331 P.2d 24, cert,
denied, 360 U.S. 314 (1958), and Franklin v. State, 513 P.2d 1252
(Nev. 1973) indicates the widely adopted position that a person released
on bail may utilize the pretrial remedy of habeas corpus to challenge the
constitutionality of the legislation restraining him or to challenge the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sufficiency of probable cause to hold him for t r i a l . Due to the appellant's
attack on the constiutionality of the legislation restraining him, and due to
his allegations of insufficiency of probable cause to hold him for trial, he
must be afforded appropriate relief by habeas corpus proceedings. Thus,
the trial court erred in dismissing the appellant's complaint for failure to
state a claim for which relief could be granted. Any other conclusion
would contradict the position taken by the majority of courts today, hobble
the effectiveness of the writ of habeas corpus and would oppose the position
taken by the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Hensley v .
Municipal Court, supra.
>

v

>

Point II

AFTER AN INDICTMENT 1$ RETURNED AND
AN ACCUSED IS ARRESTED, THERE IS NO
REASON TO DENY A REQUEST FOR VERBATIM
COPIES OF TRANSCRIPTS OF GRAND JURY
WITNESSES.
The respondents' argument in Point II of their brief r e s t s on

the theory that the historical secrecy of grand jury proceedings warrants
the denial of appellant's request for verbatim copies of transcripts of witnesses who testified against him 0 Relying on United States v 0 Kirkland,
5 Utah 123, 13 P. 234 (1887), respondents urge that secrecy of grand jury
proceedings should be retained after an indictment has been returned and
the accused has been a r r e s t e d . The Kirkland decision perhaps reflects
this court's position in 1887 but does not indicate its more recent rulings
on the question of secrecy.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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In State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P.2d 186 (1959), the
Utah Supreme Court came to a conclusion opposite to the respondent's
position, wherein it was stated:
It will be noted that after the indictment
is returned and an accused is arrested,
the reasons for secrecy have largely
been spent 0 At 187.
The historical foundation of the respondents' argument concerning the need for secrecy in the present case has crumbled in a more
recent Utah decision, Faux, supra. Because the appellant has been
indicted and arrested, the reasons for secrecy of grand jury proceedings
are nonexistent, and his request for verbatim copies of witnesses'
transcripts was improperly denied.
Point III
THERE IS NO REASON TO JUSTIFY THE
LOWER COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION.
The respondents do not deny that, according to Utah case
law, an accused charged by information has a fundamental right to a
preliminary examination, whereas the appellant, charged with the crime
of bribery, was denied such fundamental right by the trial court 0 The
appellant was denied a preliminary hearing by the mere fact that he was
indicted rather than charged by information 0 There thus exists a striking
discriminatory procedure in bringing the appellant to trial by denying
him a fundamental right afforded all other defendants in criminal
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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matters. Apart from the denial of a preliminary examination, the appellant
shares the same fundamental rights enjoyed by the defendant charged by
information; e.g 0 , the right to a jury trial, the right to remain silent,
etc. The inequities apparent in bringing the appellant to trial must be cured
unless there exists some compelling reason justifying such discriminatory
procedural practice in this state. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972);
Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107(1966); Humphrey v. Cody, 405 U.S.
504(1972).
Respondents have failed to produce any reason indicating why
a person charged by information has a pretrial right to a determination of
probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate while such pretrial
determination in the present case was left solely to the grand jury who
received evidence only from the prosecutor. The absence of any compelling reason justifying the discrimination against the appellant mandates
this court to conclude that he, as well as other defendants, has a fundamental right to a pretrial preliminary examination of probable cause by a
neutral magistrate.
Relying on the case of Thiede v. Territory of Utah, 159 U.S.
510 (1895), the respondents argue that an indictment, standing alone,
establishes probable cause sufficient to bring the accused to trial. However, the Thiede decision was rendered before Utah achieved statehood
and before the Utah Constitution was adopted. Article I, Section 13 of
the Utah Constitution provides that persons charged by information or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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indictment have a right to a preliminary examination by a magistrate
unless such examination is waived. It would seem proper for this court
to accept the language of the Constitution of the State of Utah rather than
the 81-year-old TWede decision which was rendered before the Constitution was adoptedc Reliance on the Utah Constitution mandates the conclusion that the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion for a
preliminary examination of probable cause by a magistrate.
Point IV
AFTER AN INDICTMENT IS RETURNED AND
AN ACCUSED IS ARRESTED, THERE IS NO
REASON TO DENY A REQUEST TO TAKE
DEPOSITIONS OF GRAND JURY WITNESSES.
Respondents have failed to produce any valid reason to
support the position that the appellant should be afforded pretrial discovery rights inferior to those of a defendant in a civil case. At page
20 of their brief, respondents contend that the secrecy of the grand jury
would be destroyed if the appellant were permitted to depose grand jury
witnesses. However, appellant's request for depositions was made
after he had been indicted and arrested, at a time when no reason for
secrecy exists. (See Point II of this reply brief.) Thus his request
avoids any threat of destruction to the grand jury system.
As noted on pages 23 and 24 of appellant's brief, at least
four justices of this present court have agreed that a defendant in a
criminal case should be granted equal if not superior pretrial discovery
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rights to those enjoyed by a defendant in a civil matter. Such majority
agreement with the appellant's position mandates a ruling that the lower
court erred in denying his request to take depositions.
CONCLUSION
The authority for the respondents' arguments throughout
their brief is antiquated to the degree of being inapplicable in the present
case. Recent case law, including the Hensley decision, supra, indicates
that the appellant's application for a writ of habeas corpus was his proper
remedy due to his constitutional attack on the restraint of his liberty.
The appellant's requests to obtain verbatim copies of transcripts and to
take depositions in no way threatens the secrecy of the grand jury system
as these requests were made after indictment and arrest. In light of the
fact that no such threat has been made and due to the respondents' failure
to provide any compelling reason justifying the denial of a preliminary
examination by a magistrate, the appellant's restraint is illegal and in
violation of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L . HANSEN AND ASSOCIATES
and D. FRANK WILKINS
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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